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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LEVERT TWITCHELL, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8810 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, Levert Twitchell, was convicted on Novem-
ber 5, 1957, of a violation of Section 76-30-7.4, U. C. A. 
1953, as amended by Chapter 165, Laws of Utah 1957, titled 
"Automobile Homicide." The evidence adduced at trial 
revealed that on the night of June 5, 1957, the defendant 
was the operator of an automobile involved in a two car 
head-on collision occurring in Salt Lake County, Utah. As 
as result of injuries suffered in that collision, a passenger 
of the other car, one Shirley Gillies, died on June 14, 1957. 
This appeal is primarily an attack on the constitution-
ality of the above statute. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
HOLD THE STATUTE, SECTION 76-30-7.4, U. 
C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH 
THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED, UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
POINT II. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF 
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN FROM THE DEFEN-
DANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
HOLD THE STATUTE, SECTION 76-30-7.4, U. 
C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, UNDER WHICH 
THE DEFENDANT VI AS CONVICTED, UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Section 76-30-7.4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended by Chap-
ter 165, Laws of Utah 1957, titled "Automobile Homicide", 
the statute under which defendant was convicted, provides 
as follows: 
"Any person, while under the influence of in-
toxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or who is under 
the influence of any other drug to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle, 
who causes the death of another by operating or 
driving any automobile, motorcycle or other motor 
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vehicle in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, 
or with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life 
or safety, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
state penitentiary for a period of not less than one 
year nor more than ten years. A death under this 
section, is one which occurs as a proximate result 
of the accident within a year and a day, after the 
day of the accident." 
This statute was enacted by the 1957 session of the Utah 
Legislature and has not yet been subject to judicial review 
by this Court. It was patterned after a similar Colorado 
statute. See Section 40-2-10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 
1953, discussed below. 
Appellant has grouped a number of arguments under 
title of Point I in his brief. We shall deal with them indi-
vidually and in the order there presented. 
Appellant asserts that the statute makes a felon of a 
convicted drunken driver, who by mere chance happens to, 
without intention, fatally injure another. The argument is 
not grounded on a correct analysis of the law. Examination 
of the statute reveals four elements all of which must be 
satisfied before a conviction may be had. Those elements 
might be broken down as follows : 
(1) Under the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
or 
narcotic drugs ; 
or 
under the influence of any other drug to 
a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle. 
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(2) Who causes the death of another. 
(3) By operating or driving any auto, motor-
cycle or other motor vehicle. 
( 4) In a reckless 
or 
negligent 
or 
careless manner ; 
or 
with wanton or reckless disregard of 
human life or safety. 
Thus a person may not be convicted on the basis of a killing 
by mere chance; rather, it must be proven that the opera-
tion of the vehicle was reckless, negligent, careless or with 
a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or safety. 
Appellant maintains that the statute amounts to special 
legislation forbidden by Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah 
Constitution. In the case of State v. Kalla8 (1939 Utah), 
94 P. 2d 414, this Court defined general and special laws. 
"Constitutional law-what are general laws. 
Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon all 
members of any class of persons, places, or things 
requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the 
matters covered by the laws in question, are general 
and not special. (See 25 R. C. L. 814.) 
"Definition-special and local law. Special leg-
islation is such as relates either to particular per-
sons, places, or things, or to persons, places, or 
things which, though not particularized, are sepa-
rated by any method of selection from the whole 
class to which the law might, but for such legisla-
tion, be applied, * * * " 
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The Legislature may, without violating the constitutional 
inhibition against special legislation, make classifications 
so long as those classifications are reasonable. In Lyte v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County (1936 Utah), 62 P. 2d 
1117, this Court said: 
"The true practical limitation of the legislative 
power to classify is that the classification shall be 
upon some apparent natural reason,-some reason 
suggested by necessity, by such a difference in the 
situation and circumstances of the subjects placed 
in different classes as suggest the necessity of pro-
priety of different legislation with respect to them." 
Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. 800, 802. 
In the Kallas case, supra, counsel there took a position 
very similar to the one urged by appellant here. The stat-
ute under attack was one making it an indictable misde-
meanor to maintain an establishment where alcoholic bev-
erages were sold illegally, defining the violation as a nuis-
ance. See Section 195 of Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1937. 
Counsel there argued that since there was already on the 
statute books an offense titled a nuisance punishable as a 
misdemeanor, the Legislature had enacted special legisla-
tion to stigmatize the same act [meaning "nuisance"] with 
two distinct penalties, one a misdemeanor and the other an 
indictable misdemeanor, leaving to the whim or caprice of 
the pleador the procedure or practice to be followed in two 
similar cases. The Court rejected the argument holding 
that the legislation was general. 
Appellant asserts that the automobile homicide law is 
a special law because it makes no distinction between those 
persons left in a class who may be guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter and those who may be guilty of automobile 
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homicide, making no distinction in the offensive act itself 
and leaving the method of classification to the whim and 
caprice of a prosecutor who may prosecute A for a felony 
and B for a misdemeanor when both can be guilty of exactly 
the same criminal act. See Page 9 of Appellant's brief. 
Such is not the case. Section 76-30-5, U .. C. A. 1953, pro-
viding for the offense of involuntary manslaughter, and 
the offense under consideration here, are separate and dis-
tinct offenses. In certain cases it might be that a person 
guilty of violating the automobile homicide statute could 
have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter (but this 
is not certain because of the degree of negligence required 
under each offense). The converse, however, is certainly 
not true. The automobile homicide statute is a felony of-
fense while involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor, 
and for conviction under the former, elements not required 
for conviction under the latter must be shown, viz., no one 
may be convicted of automobile homicide unless, first, death 
results out of the operation of a motor vehicle and, second, 
the person so operating the vehicle was intoxicated or under 
the influence of drugs. Death due to the reckless conduct 
of another, but absent the above two elements, could not be 
the basis of a prosecution under this statute. If it can be 
said that the statute classifies those persons who drive 
when under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, then 
it is submitted that such classification is reasonable under 
the circumstances. 
Appellant's next argument within Point I asserts that 
the statute is violative of Article VI, Section 23 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides: 
"Except general appropriation bills, and bills 
for the codification and general revision of laws, no 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
bill shall be passed containing more than one sub-
ject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." 
It is urged that there are two subjects contained in the 
statute, the first, driving under the influence of alcohol, 
and the second, driving under the influence of any other 
drug to a degree which renders him incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle and, furthermore, that the title of the 
statute mentions only the former. 
This Court has on numerous occasions considered and 
construed Article VI, Section 23 and has expressed itself 
reluctant to declare acts unconstitutional on the ground 
that the subject is not sufficiently expressed or indicated 
in the title. Naylor v. Crabbe (1915 Utah), 148 P. 359. The 
Court has also said that this constitutional section should be 
applied liberally in favor of upholding the law, and that too 
strict an application might result in hampering wholesome 
legislation. Salt Lake City v. Wilson (1915 Utah), 148 P. 
1104. The purpose of the constitutional provision was de-
scribed by this Court in State v. Kallas, cited supra. 
"The constitutional provision is for a practical 
purpose and it is not a technical restriction on the 
legislature. That practical purpose is to inform the 
legislature and the public what legislation is pro-
posed, and a title is sufficient that will lead to an 
inquiry into the body of the act to ascertain changes 
proposed in the original and existing law." 
Furthermore, a title was never intended to be an index to 
a law. If the title in its broad and popular and not in its 
technical and restricted sense gives the "general subject" 
of the enacted legislation, it is sufficient. State v. McCorn-
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ish (1921 Utah), 201 P. 637. It was further said in Mar-
tineau v. Crabbe (1915 Utah), 150 P. 301: 
"* * * Manifestly the purpose of this pro-
vision of the Constitution is to prevent the Legisla-
ture from intermingling in one act two or more 
separate and distinct propositions-things which, in 
a legal sense, have no connection with, or proper 
relation to, each other. The reasons for, and the 
scope of, constitutional provisions of this character, 
are well illustrated in 26 A. & E. Ency. L. (2d Ed.) 
575, in the following language: 
" 'This requirement of singleness is not intended 
to embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent 
the vicious practice of joining in one act incongru-
ous and unrelated matters; and if all the parts of a 
statute have a natural connection and reasonably 
relate, directly or indirectly to one general and legiti-
mate subject of legislation, the act is not open to 
the objection of plurality, no matter how extensively 
or minutely it deals with the details looking to the 
accomplishment of the main legislative purpose.' " 
Analysis of the statute does not reveal a violation of the 
above constitutional prohibition. The statute is directed 
against those individuals causing death through the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle who, while so operating, are under 
the influence of liquor, narcotic drugs or other drugs. These 
are not "separate and distinct propositions" nor are they 
"incongruous and unrelated matters." They all pertain and 
are directed against the inherent danger arising when a 
person operates a motor vehicle when his physical faculties 
are impaired by a form of stimulant. An essential element 
of the crime is that the person be "under the influence of" 
(a) intoxicating liquor, (b) narcotic drugs or (c) any 
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other drug to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle. These factors are clearly related. 
The title of the statute is found in Chapter 165, Laws 
of Utah 1957. It is quoted on page 10 of appellant's brief. 
It does omit mention of being under the influence of a drug; 
however, it does mention "driving a vehicle under the in-
fluence of alcohol" and "operation of a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated." The omission from the title is not significant. 
The substance of the statute, reasonably explained in the 
title, is that it seeks to prevent a person from operating 
a motor vehicle who has taken substances into his body 
which have impaired his physical faculties. The title ex-
plains the general subject sufficiently to inform the Legis-
lature and the public of what legislation is proposed. Under 
the legal standards as quoted from the decisions above, 
it is submitted that there is but one subject to the statute 
and that is stated clearly in the title. 
Counsel also objects that the phrase "any other drug" 
would include such drugs as antihistamines, sleeping pills 
and tranquillizers. It is noted, however, that the statute 
in that instance requires a more comprehensive showing of 
physical impairment by providing that a person using "any 
other drug" shall not be deemed guilty unless he is shown 
to be under the influence of the drug to the extent that he 
is "incapable of safely driving a vehicle." 
On page 12 of appellant's brief it is urged that the 
statute is void because it violates Article I, Section 7 of the 
State Constitution in that the statute fails to require an 
intent to kill another, depriving defendant of a defense 
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and thereby violating due process. The Legislature ha1 
power to create a statutory offense and to establish thE 
elements thereof, and it is not essential as a matter of la'" 
that an intent to kill be an element. 
We are aware of no constitutional provision or com-
mon law right requiring that a penal statute, as the one here, 
to be valid, provide as an element proof of an intent to kill. 
Nor do we see how due process is violated thereby. Certainly 
the intent required in first degree murder prosecutions is of 
a different quality and nature than that required in second 
degree murder or voluntary manslaughter prosecutions. 
Appellant concedes that under the felony murder rule a 
person may be convicted of murder although there need 
be no showing of intent to kill, as where death occurs in 
the commission of certain felonies, e. g. arson, burglary 
and rape. It has long been a foundation of the criminal 
law that to constitute a criminal act there must be present 
two elements ; an act and an intent. The intent may be 
a general one and here the Legislature did not see fit to re-
quire a showing of a specific intent. All that need be shown 
is that accused voluntarily did the acts which constitute 
the offense. The following statement quoted from Burdick, 
Law of Crime, Vol. 1, Sec. 113, is pertinent to this issue: 
"In criminal law, 'intent' means a state of mind 
which willingly consents to the act that is done, or 
free will, choice, or volition in the doing of an act. 
It means that the act is voluntary, that it proceeds 
from a mind free to act in distinction from an act 
done without mental capacity to understand its na-
ture, or under circumsances which sufficiently show 
that it was the result of involuntary forces and 
against the will. 
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"* * * 
"Much misunderstanding has undoubtedly arisen 
by confusing the objective of this mental element of 
intent. It is not necessarily an intent to break the 
law, although such an intent is often present, be-
cause one may be entirely ignorant that the act he 
is doing is a violation of law, nevertheless his ig-
norance of the law is no excuse. It is not necessarily 
an intent to do anything wrong, or even immoral, 
but an intent to do the act. 
"The intent to do what is done imports a crim-
inal intent if the act is criminal. One who would 
not intentionally do what he believed to be wrong 
may commit an act that is punishable by law, and 
if his act is voluntarily done, the intent to do the 
act is present, and it constitutes a criminal intent." 
* * * 
Appellant asserts that this statute, when considered 
together with the involuntary manslaughter statute, Sec-
tion 76-30-5, U. C. A. 1953, is unconstitutional as violating 
the provisions of Article I, Section 2, in that it does not 
afford equal protection to all (see page 12 of appellant's 
brief), and further, that it violates Article I, Section 12 
in that it puts the person twice in jeopardy for the same 
offense, to-wit: automobile homicide and involuntary man-
slaughter. As discussed above, these two offenses are sepa-
rate and distinct; they have different elements. It might 
be the case under some circumstances that involuntary man-
slaughter would be a lesser included offense of automobile 
homicide, but on that basis appellant's argument would 
apply with the same strength to other offenses when con-
sidered together. Rape would include an assault and bat-
tery as would murder or manslaughter. 
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One of the primary purposes for the enactment of penal 
laws is their deterrent effect. The number of deaths re-
sulting from motor vehicle collisions has been a matter of 
great public concern. It is likewise of concern that upon 
analysis the cause of a large percentage of such collisions 
may be attributed to the intoxication or doped condition of 
a driver. Presumably the Legislature, in enacting the "au-
tomobile homicide" law, had in mind the dangers inherent 
when a motor vehicle is operated on a public way by an 
intoxicated person. It is a matter of common knowledge 
that an individual's physical reaction is slowed, his judg-
ment of speed and distance affected, and his general physi-
cal faculties impaired when he is intoxicated or under the 
influence of certain stimulants. 
It is noteworthy that legislation of this nature is not 
original in this state. Colorado, as stated above, has a simi-
lar law. It provides : 
"Driving under influence-death. Any person 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of 
any exhilarating or stupefying drug, who causes the 
death of another by operating or driving any auto-
mobile, motorcycle or other motor vehicle in a reck-
less, negligent or careless manner, or with a wanton 
or reckless disregard of human life or safety, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state peni-
tentiary for a period of not less than one year nor 
more than fourteen years." 
Section 40-2-10, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953. This 
measure was enacted by the Colorado Legislature in 1923. 
There are in the Colorado Code Annotated seven Colorado 
Supreme Court cases concerning appeals from convictions 
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under the above statute. Florida has a similar law. Chap-
ter 860.01, Florida Statutes, 1957, provides: 
"* * * If, however, damage to property or 
person of another, other than damage resulting in 
death of any person, is done by said intoxicated per-
son under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such 
extent as to deprive him of full possession of his 
normal faculties, by reason of the operation of any 
of said vehicles mentioned herein, he shall upon 
conviction be fined not more than five hundred dol-
lars, and also be imprisoned not less than three 
months nor more than twelve months, and if the 
death of any human being be caused by the operation 
of a motor vehicle by any person while intoxicated, 
such person shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter, 
and on conviction be punished as provided by exist-
ing law relating to manslaughter." * * * 
The Florida manslaughter statute provides for penalties 
of not to exceed 20 years in the state prison or of not to 
exceed one year in the county jail. 
In Barrington v. State (1940 Fla.), 199 So. 320, a con-
viction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida where 
the defendant had been convicted of having effected the 
death of another person while intoxicated and while oper-
ating a motor vehicle in violation of the above quoted penal 
statute. The constitutionality of the statute was not at-
tacked. The Florida court did say: 
"* * * the purpose of such statutes is ob-
vious, namely, to safeguard motorists and protect 
them particularly from those who venture forth on 
the highways in automobiles while at the time not 
having full possession of their faculties due to the 
over-indulgence of intoxicating liquors, * * * " 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
It is noted that unlike the Utah statute, the Florida law 
does not require a finding of negligence or carelessness. 
See Chapter 782.07, Florida Statutes, 1957. A Texas stat-
ute, Article 802c, Vernon's Penal Code, provides: 
"Any person who drives or operates an automo-
bile or any other motor vehicle upon any public road 
or highway in this state, or upon any street or alley 
or any other place within the limits of an incorpor-
ated city, town or village, while such person is in-
toxicated or under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, and while so driving and operating such 
automobile * * * shall through accident or 
mistake do another act which if voluntarily done 
would be a felony, shall receive the punishment 
affixed to the felony actually committed." 
The Texas statute does not require a finding of carelessness 
or negligence. Prosecutions under the above statute are 
termed murder without malice. See McKinnon v. State 
(1953 Tex.), 261 S. W. 2d 335. There have been a number 
of appellate decisions in the state of Texas concerning the 
above statute. In Ruedas v. State, 158 S. W. 2d 500, it was 
held that the above statute was not unconstitutional as em-
f bracing more than one subject. In Brandon v. State, 176 
S. W. 2d 323, it was held that the statute was not invalid 
on the ground of indefiniteness. See also Flowers v. State 
(1947 Tex.), 202 S. W. 2d 462; McCarthy v. State, 218 S. 
W. 2d 190, and Sirnmons v. State (1943 Tex.), 169 S. W. 
2d 171. 
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POINT II. 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO 
ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE THE RESULTS OF 
A BLOOD TEST TAKEN FROM THE DEFEN-
DANT. 
In Point II of appellant's brief it is contended that the 
admission into evidence of the results of a blood test taken 
from defendant when he was unconscious was a violation 
of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, in that 
it compelled defendant to testify against himself. 
The factual basis of this point is that defendant was 
unconscious at the time the blood sample was taken from 
him, but the transcript reveals contrary evidence. The 
witness, Doctor Parkinson, who took the blood testified 
that the defendant was conscious, that he was sitting in a 
chair and was able to talk, and that he offered no resistance 
to the procedure. See Transcript p. 114. Another witness, 
Dr. Heusinkveld, testified that the defendant signed a 
statement granting permission to take the blood, see Trans-
cript, pages 94 to 97. Even if the admission of the blood 
test were error it is submitted that there was sufficient 
evidence that defendant was under the influence of liquor. 
A bartender testified that the defendant was intoxicated 
just prior to the time of the accident, Transcript p. 81. Two 
of the physicians who examined the defendant shortly after 
the collision testified that in their opinion he was clinically 
intoxicated. See Transcript, pages 94 and 114. 
In response to appellant's contention, it is submitted 
that even assuming the defendant was unconscious at the 
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time of the examination it was not error to admit the blood 
test evidence. 
The general rule and the better reasoned authorities 
conclude that the privilege against self-incrimination should 
not be construed to apply to evidence derived from physical 
analysis or examination, but that the purpose of the privi-
lege is to protect persons from convicting themselves 
through their own testimony. It has been generally held 
that the privilege against self-incrimination was not vio-
lated by the reception of evidence of blood tests. People v. 
Tucker, (1948 Calif.), 198 P. 2d 941; Block v. People (1951 
Colo.), 240 P. 2d 512; State v. Ayres (1949 Idaho), 211 P. 
2d 142; State v. Sturtevant (1950 New. Hamp.), 70 A. 2d 
909, and State v. Cram (1945 Ore.), 160 P. 2d 283. The 
same ruling has been applied in cases involving the admis-
sion of evidence derived from urine analysis for alcohol 
in drunken driving prosecutions. Also, requiring a person 
to exhibit scars on his body to the jury has been held to be 
no violation of the right, State v. Oschoa (Nev.), 242 P. 
582, and the same rule has been applied to fingerprinting. 
United States v. Kelly (2d Cir.), 55 F. 2d 67. 
In an Oregon conviction similar to the one at bar, 
State v. Cram, cited supra, a manslaughter prosecution 
based on death occurring as a result of an automobile ac-
cident, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the admission 
of testimony concerning alcoholic contents of a blood sample 
compulsorily taken from a driver following an accident, 
when he was unconscious, was not a violation of defendant's 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
Wigmore has enunciated a rule of distinction followed 
by a number of states, that the privilege against self-in-
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crimination was established in the common law for the 
purpose of protecting the individual against the employ-
ment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips 
an admission of his guilt; that the privilege should be 
confined to testimonial utterances and not applied to physi-
cal evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol. 3, 
Sec. 2263. 
In a very recent Oklahoma case, Alexander v. State 
(1956 Okla.), 305 P. 2d 572, a prosecution for drunken 
driving, the Criminal Court of Appeals of that state held 
that the privilege against self-incrimination was not violated 
by the admission of testimony of a police officer as to the 
results of the Harger breath test or drunkometer test for 
alcoholic content of blood, resulting from examination of 
defendant by police officer without defendant's permission. 
The Oklahoma court relied on the Wigmore rule stated 
supra, making a distinction between oral evidence and 
evidence procured by examination of the body or of bodily 
fluids. 
Although appellant did not attack the admission of this 
evidence on the grounds that it deprived him of liberty 
without due process of law as was done in the Rochin case, 
Rochin v. California (1952), 342 U. S. 165, a recent deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court clarified that 
question in circumstances similar to the case here. In 
Breithaupt v. Abram ( 1957), 352 U. S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 
it was held that it was not a violation of due process to 
admit into evidence for the purpose of proving intoxication 
a blood sample taken from the defendant while he was un-
conscious. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
GARY L. THEURER, 
Assistant Attorney Genera~ 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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